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“FRAMING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION”
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw* †
With the passage of the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”),
Michigan joins California and Washington to constitute the new postaffirmative action frontier. For proponents such as Ward Connerly, affirmative action is on the edge of extinction. Connerly plans to carry his
campaign against what he calls “racial preferences” to eight states in 2008,
scoring a decisive Super-Tuesday repudiation of a social policy that he portrays as the contemporary face of racial discrimination.
On the other side of the issue, proponents of affirmative action are
struggling to regroup, fearful that the confluence of lukewarm support
among Democratic allies, messy presidential politics and a menacing Supreme Court may spell the end of affirmative action as we know it. Of
course predictions of the untimely departure of affirmative action have been
wrong before. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s surprising decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger caught runaway circuit judges and trigger happy pundits celebrating the demise of affirmative action a little too soon.
Yet the terms of the Court’s decision sparing affirmative action from
constitutional death inexorably led to the MCRI. Staging an end-run around
Grutter, MCRI’s proponents sought to capitalize on the fact that while the
Court permitted affirmative action to survive as an institutional prerogative
of the law school, it did not recognize affirmative action as a matter of constitutional right, a guardian against the unwarranted exclusion of
institutionally marginalized groups. Grutter did reaffirm and expand the
diversity logic of Justice Powell’s “lonely opinion” in University of California Regents v. Bakke, previously maligned and discredited by antiaffirmative action forces. Yet the Court failed to breathe new life into a more
fundamental predicate for affirmative action articulated in the footnotes of
Powell’s compromise judgment. There Justice Powell suggested that if there
was evidence that the traditional admissions criteria constituted an unfair
barrier for qualified minority students then affirmative action policies that
offset those criteria would not represent a form of preferential treatment.
Unsurprisingly, neither Michigan nor any other university seeking to defend
affirmative action has opted to re-present these measures as something other
than racial preferences. It is this failure to challenge the fundamental baselines of merit which ground allegations of preferential treatment that leaves
affirmative action defenseless, a rudderless vessel set adrift upon a sea of
distortion and racial resentment.
*

Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
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The politics of racial resentment, readily expressed and fully mobilized
in the campaign to enact the MCRI, should give pause to anyone who carries even a vague sense that political majorities ought not be trusted to
dictate the rights and interests of relatively powerless groups. One need not
be a radical critic of contemporary hegemonic practices to voice this concern. The idea that such exercises of electoral power cannot be uncritically
accepted as a product of deliberative democracy is deeply rooted—albeit
inconsistently acknowledged—in our Republic. Yet notwithstanding Madison’s famous reservations, the celebrated footnote 4, and a half century of
jurisprudence acknowledging the risks of the tyranny of the majority, concerns that the MCRI and Connerly’s national campaign might constitute
precisely this phenomenon have been fairly muted across the political spectrum. Indeed, the very perception that this trio of anti-affirmative initiatives
constitutes a mortal wound to affirmative action is premised on the appearance of a fair and legitimate process by which affirmative action has been
presented, evaluated, and repudiated not only in the court of popular opinion
but in courts of law as well. Yet, this appearance of cross-institutional settlement on the question of affirmative action is the product of a framing.
Obscured in the framing of this issue as a principled debate about “preferences” is the collusion between constitutional, political and cultural forces
insulating the current distribution of racial power and installing a particular
social ideology—colorblindness—as the exclusive vision of racial justice in
American society. This is a vicious circle rather than a parallel press, with
feedback loops that together constitute a structured pattern of racial inequality.
The Set-Up
What enhances the appearance of fairness and cross-institutional settlement is the assumption that the MCRI constitutes an exercise in deliberative
democracy, a by-the-book, up-or-down vote in which the populace has rendered an informed, considered judgment on the matter. As a judgment from
a parallel institution to the courts, it adds another arrow to the antiaffirmative action quiver. Yet the MCRI does not stand apart as a separate
institutional judgment. The presumption of institutional fairness that attaches to the MCRI is itself a product of the judicially authorized ideology
that these political contests are supposed to affirm or reject.
At the Court level, affirmative action is set up as a preference by undercutting the relevance of the very inequalities that affirmative action is meant
to correct. The very fact that affirmative action is not required and is thus
vulnerable to majoritarian politics is a product of a doctrine that acknowledges societal discrimination but labels it too amorphous and “ageless” for
judicially sanctioned remediation. Yet it is into this very arena of disadvantage and discrimination that the Court delivers affirmative action, permitting
the majority to kill these policies while retaining preferences that channel
opportunities to recipients they prefer. This electoral process, animated in
the Michigan campaign by stereotyping, scape-goating and fraudulent canvassing, is dubbed “deliberative” by the mere fact that people have voted. A
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decision that rests the legitimacy of the MCRI on the mere fact that “the
people have voted” means that the Court has associated democracy with
majoritarian decision-making in a context distorted by societal discrimination, historical segregation, and the sustained competitive advantage of
whites over nonwhites. This societal disadvantage, represented as “just
there” is in fact constructed, facilitated and reinforced by the very rules of
competition between whites and nonwhites that the Court has authorized in
the struggle for opportunity, resources, representation, and power.
The Court’s “neutrality,” expressed through its refusal to intervene in a
decision by the electorate, stands in marked contrast to its interventions
against political decisions that facilitate affirmative action on behalf of minority interests. Although the MCRI targets only racial and gender
“preferences” while leaving a host of genuine preferences fully viable, this
gerrymandered bit of constitutional lawmaking retains its aura of legitimacy
because the “preferences” that were eliminated are formally symmetrical—
the ban applies to whites as well as nonwhites, to men as well as women—
even though the effects are functionally asymmetrical. But the choice to
highlight form over function, to ground equality in formal symmetry rather
than functional asymmetry, is an ideological component of colorblindness
itself. It is a contemporary framing choice seriously compromised by its legacy as a descendent of Plessy v. Ferguson, where its focus on segregation’s
symmetries (both blacks and whites were disabled from sitting in each others
cars) rather than its asymmetries (segregation symbolized and created second
class citizenship for Blacks) rendered segregation perfectly constitutional.
Of course, a different constitutional predicate—a different frame and a
different set of background rules—would limit the opportunities for majorities to add affirmative action to the long list of decisions undertaken to push
back against equality demands of racial minorities. A different understanding of where the line should be drawn between “actual” discrimination and
“societal” discrimination might broaden the responsibility of gatekeepers
and managers to correct and limit the effects of discrimination manifested
within their institutions. A fuller appreciation of how race specific public
policies reach into the future through legal rules insulating current distributions of wealth and entitlements might help discredit assertions that the
status quo represents a fair and neutral baseline from which to measure corrective measures. An understanding of intentional discrimination informed
by cognitive research would broaden the range of discriminatory outcomes
that could be viewed as correctible by institutional actors seeking to eliminate the effects of discrimination within their own spheres of influence. In
short, a broader, deeper understanding of discrimination would create a
broader and deeper predicate for affirmative action.
Colorblindness
At the same time that affirmative action has been framed in a manner
that invites fierce resistance, the campaign to eliminate race and gender conscious remedies has been largely underappreciated for the radical
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intervention that it actually represents. Anti-affirmative action activists
frame their efforts as a simple plea to return to a fairer time before affirmative action distorted and unfairly denied deserving whites and men an equal
opportunity. In this light, the MCRI delivers us to that past and releases us
from an unfortunate and divisive conflict about race and gender preferences.
Even many of those who would rather maintain affirmative action temporarily
are sympathetic to the idea that its elimination will bring an end to racial and
gender jockeying and the divisive politics of resentment. They may have preferred an end to come later, perhaps on Justice O’Connor’s twenty-five year
time frame, but eliminating it now is seen to have many positive effects.
This assumption is a mistake. As Michigan citizens will soon witness,
there is no simple end to affirmative action discourse because the campaign
against these policies does not have a simple, straightforward target. Indeed,
its purpose is not simply a matter of eliminating a set of policies, but in installing a particular orientation towards inequality itself—one that mandates
the elimination of race or gender discourses rooted in redistribution. The
central assumption that animates the anti-preference movement is that all
identity-conscious policies constitute forms of preferential treatment and
discrimination. Yet, critics of affirmative action cannot effortlessly achieve
their goal without pitched and bloody institutional battles because antiaffirmative propositions such as MCRI cannot on their own mandate gender
blindness or color blindness. Such initiatives simply require nondiscrimination and the elimination of what is perceived to be preferential
treatment. To fully realize the elimination of all race or gender conscious
policies, there would have to be consensus that all identity conscious policies constitute preferences. As subsequent litigation and contestation over
affirmative action will reveal, exactly which departures from colorblindness
or gender-blindness constitute impermissible preferences and which do not
is in no way subject to categorical definition.
Installing this ideology across a host of institutions is where the next
battle lies. The MCRI is not the end game, but simply a beachhead from
which to ground a dizzying attack on a wide array of politics and practices.
Even voters who supported Proposal 2 might be surprised at the great
lengths that organized opposition will take to install this vision. If the experience of California serves as a true measure, Michiganders will witness
attacks against an array of programs and policies that stretch even the most
conventional definitions of what constitutes “preferential treatment.” They
should not be surprised to find challenges to ethnic and women’s studies programs, identity-based student organizations, ethnic alumni associations,
outreach and noticing requirements, and even breast cancer screenings and
domestic violence shelters as forms of preference. Not all of these efforts will
be successful, but they clearly confirm that there is a broader agenda at play.
Where the proponents of anti-affirmative action initiatives are likely to
achieve effortless victories is in institutions that have heretofore failed to
subject their everyday practices and organizational values to any meaningful
equity analysis. The consequences of this failure may well generate a surprising split among various segments of affirmative action’s supporters.
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Predictably, some members of this constituency—most likely the beneficiaries themselves—will assume that the successful history of using differential
criteria to select, educate and produce generations of highly successful and
accomplished minority professionals will forever foreclose a hasty retreat to
criteria that will reproduce racial disparities that rival the 1960s. If gatekeepers were thought to have learned anything from the several decades in
which affirmative action was practiced, one might certainly presume that at
least one lesson would point to the intolerable unfairness of sustaining what
has been revealed to be artificial barriers to exclude generations of minorities who are virtually identical in promise to those alums who are feted and
celebrated by their respective institutions. Those who resist a return to the
exclusive use of undifferentiated criteria might be buoyed in their hopes that
the high level studies that confirm the success of affirmative admissions
policies would reinforce their arguments that differential criteria are not
preferences at all, and that if anything violates the MCRI, it would be the
unjustified return to exclusionary criteria. Not only preferences are barred
by MCRI, but discrimination as well. But the assumption that affirmative
action supporters would stand shoulder to shoulder to collectively interrogate their institution’s exclusionary practices will lead to profound
disappointment for those who hope for a united front. What will be revealed
is that for many traditional supporters of affirmative action, this commitment does not constitute an indictment of the standard criteria, nor does it
reveal an awareness of the racial parameters of exclusion that affirmative
action was intended to neutralize. Unfortunately, since affirmative action
policies have been seen as special measures to lift up the marginally qualified, many supporters will snap back to the traditional criteria so fast that
heads will spin. Worst still will be those who will “overinterpret” the MCRI,
believing that the very act of noticing much less commenting on the racial
hemorrhaging that will take place runs afoul of the MCRI.
In these moments, proponents of MCRI will be gleefully close to being
handed their ultimate goal, one wished for but not mandated by the MCRI.
What will emerge is a recognition that what is really at stake here is more
than eliminating so-called “reverse discrimination.” These battles will reveal
that the agenda here is to erase our very ability to articulate any legitimate
rationale for recognizing—must less neutralizing—the profound asymmetries in opportunity and access that exist throughout American society. What
the proponents of the ideology of colorblindness seek is far more than some
ideal of equality. Theirs is a much more radical agenda designed to resolve
the problem of inequality by essentially removing it from political and legal
discourse altogether.
Competing Backstories
At the end of the day, whether the advocates for MCRI, and other initiatives like it, can successfully extend their campaign deep into our political
culture turns on the relative strength of their backstory in comparison to the
counter-narrative offered by those who defend affirmative action. The MCRI

CRENSHAW FINAL.DOC

128

2/2/2007 11:00 PM

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

[Vol. 105:123

back story paints a clear portrait, although it represents a societal fantasy. Its
language invites voters to cast a vote for a return to the past. It is hard to see
how an explicit invitation to return to an American past can possibly function as an endorsement of colorblindness, but the past that the MCRI invites
Americans to join is a mythical past wherein equal treatment and nondiscrimination ruled the day. It is a past where people were given a fair
shake based not on who they were, but on their merit. Affirmative action is
said to have disrupted this past to create the proportional representation of
underrepresented minorities in a broad range of American institutions. In
this sense, equality of opportunity is said to have been replaced by equality
of results. And, the language of the Civil Rights Movement appears to add
moral authority to this fantasy.
This back story, obviously fabricated and thin on reality, nonetheless
finds amplification in the opinions of more influential and legitimate sources
such as the Supreme Court. In each of its major affirmative action cases, the
racial past has been pictured as a distant reality disconnected from the present. From this perspective, antidiscrimination law appears as a portal
through which contemporary Americans stepped through to a brand new
present, a world free of the structural iniquities forged during the era of
American apartheid. Indeed, the present is so attenuated from that past that
we have to speculate whether the social realities in which we now live bear
anything but the most coincidental relation to our nations recent past. The
popular fiction of a past where equality reins supreme, a past divorced from
social reality, serves to reframe contemporary forms of racial inequality as
somewhat of a sociological puzzle, largely the result of cultural and personal
choices that should not be artificially interfered with or socially engineered
out of existence.
These descriptive world views ground the claim that colorblindness
symbolizes nothing more than a return to an era of principled equality
wherein one pays little or no attention to a person’s racial identity. Yet this
colorblind ideal is fueled by racial stereotypes and group-based explanations
for the marginalization of certain racial minorities, justifications that contradict the idea that this perspective transcends a color conscious prism. To the
contrary, colorblind advocates rely on logics of racial difference to naturalize and legitimize the very inequalities that affirmative action seeks to
remedy. Consider Ward Connerly’s response to the fact that out of more than
4,200 freshmen currently enrolled at UCLA, only about 100 are African
American. His assertion that black freshmen would do better if they stopped
listening to rap music and focused on the books is the quintessential illustration of the color-conscious politics of the so-called colorblind constituency.
The Public Debate
The public debate on affirmative action receives and amplifies the opponents’ backstory both in terms of what it chooses to highlight and what it
systematically chooses to ignore. The growing sense that race discrimination
and inequality is passé and largely irrelevant is amplified, if not actually

CRENSHAW FINAL.DOC

2007]

2/2/2007 11:00 PM

“Framing Affirmative Action”

129

produced, in the media’s failure to actively report on the reasons why affirmative action is necessary. A study by the media watchdog Fairness and
Accuracy in Reporting drives this point home. FAIR researched the coverage of affirmative action in major newspapers over a six month period and
found that in over 80% of the stories affirmative action was not linked in
any way to processes of discrimination or inequality. Affirmative action in
these stories is wholly disconnected from any sense of fairness, and unrelated obstacles and disadvantages that might be faced by its beneficiaries.
Readers are thus invited to view the dearth of minorities that would otherwise prevail in the absence of affirmative action as simply the product of
their own making. Without saying so, affirmative action is thus easily presented at best as an act of noblesse oblige, and at worst as unfair act of
social engineering.
Equally telling was the fact that the vast majority of stories failed to
mention either white women or other people of color as beneficiaries of affirmative action. Most of the very few that did mention white women or
other racial groups soon abandoned even this momentary recognition to focus exclusively on African Americans as the focus of the controversy. The
role of African Americans as the sole representative of affirmative action
was starkly symbolized by a cover illustration on the Newsweek issue providing coverage on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. Appearing
under the title, Affirmative Action: Do We Still Need It? 10 Ways to Think
about it Now was a picture of a young African American man, dressed in
preppy khakis, shirt, and tie. Wearing spectacles and sporting a book, the
figure cut a confident pose reflecting apparent class advantage and perhaps
even racial entitlement. Unknown to the casual observer, the image itself
was utterly staged—the young man was not a University of Michigan student but a model. Credits on the inside cover provide appropriate
acknowledgements to the various vendors that supplied the tie, the specs and
the clothes.
For Newsweek, this illustration represented the quintessential image of
the affirmative action beneficiary as a means to suggest at least three ways
of thinking about whether affirmative action was still necessary: the programs were about race, not about gender, they were about African
Americans, not about other people of color, and they were about extending
advantages to elite Blacks, rather than impoverished African Americans.
Thus, the graphic powerfully amplified the distorted discourse around affirmative action, one that suggests that these policies represent a set of
entitlement programs for middle class and potentially undeserving African
Americans. Of course nothing could be further from the truth. This is simply
a gross distortion of reality, especially given that the primary beneficiaries
of affirmative action have been Euro-American women.
This stereotypical image captures in multiple ways the distorted framing
of affirmative action that advocates must learn to meet more effectively.
Recognizing that anti-Black stereotypes constitute readily deployable capital against affirmative action presents a delicate Catch 22 for proponents.
They must meet the stereotypes squarely while at the same time broadening
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the image of the beneficiary class to reveal the multitude of non-African
Americans who have benefited from these programs and who also stand to
lose should they be eliminated. Yet the call to perform this delicate maneuver in Michigan gave way to a rather blunt and ultimately ineffective
strategy of highlighting women and girls as the principle beneficiaries of
affirmative action.
Replicating the strategy used in Washington, the campaign to defeat
MCRI featured images, testimonials and radio spots that focused on affirmative action’s benefits to women. In this sense, the campaign sought to
reframe affirmative action as something other than a black entitlement program. Instead, it was presented as a friendlier, familiar, and family-centric
set of programs that benefited working families. Supporters of affirmative
action also sought an upbeat chord, amplifying the trend away from the
negative imagery associated with racial discrimination toward a positive
message of opportunity and shared destiny across racial group differences.
Media gurus, pollsters, and opinion researchers seemed to advise that contested social justice issues might be better positioned in the public mind if
they were reframed in a manner that avoided the “divisiveness” of racial
discourse.
But, there are serious limitations to this strategy, and the outcomes in
California, Washington and Michigan indicate that this approach is not a
recipe for success. The strategy hardly seemed effective in persuading white
women—only 43% of them voted against Proposal 2 in Michigan while
57% voted for its passage. In the ten years since the adoption of Prop. 209 in
California, there has been virtually no movement in persuading white
women to vote in favor of affirmative action. Moreover, this way of framing
the debate managed to capture only 42% of the overall vote. The only good
news is that greater percentages of people of color voted against the proposal in Michigan than in California, an even more impressive fact given
that many minority organizers complained that anti-MCRI messaging was
not targeted to their communities.
It is probably true, of course, that so-called “persuadable” audiences initially responded positively to affirmative action when these messages are
grounded in their understanding of barriers to women’s advancement. However, this receptivity does not appear to be sustainable during the long road
to the ballot box. It is possible that this strategy proved ineffective because it
failed to contest the racially tinted frames that Americans already have about
this issue. Foregrounding (white) women in the frame does little to erase the
omnipresent racial subject that serves as a lightning rod for most of the
stereotypes associated with affirmative action. Blacks are still at the center
of the picture, and voters who show some receptivity to the gender analysis
still must be inoculated in some way against the stereotypes and race-baiting
that pervades this debate. Opponents of affirmative action managed to simply roll the campaign’s highlighting of women into their unchanged view
that the debate was really about Black people. Said one Michigan woman of
her white friends, “A lot of them see right through this campaign strategy.
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They say that it is obvious that ‘the Blacks’ are getting the white women to
carry their water for them.”
Track Metaphor
If affirmative action is to be rescued, the distorted conceptual box which
it has been forced to occupy in law, politics and culture must be revealed,
contested and discarded. Affirmative action is at a crossroads and may indeed cease to exist as we know it. But ending affirmative action as we know
can, in fact, be an opportunity to know affirmative action in a different way.
Indeed, what most people think they know about affirmative isn’t right, and
what is right about affirmative action most people don’t know.
The contest now is to reframe and reground these vitally important opportunity policies in all spheres of American society. The campaign to
defend affirmative action has to be a campaign to reframe the terms of the
debate. Not only must new images, new messages and new strategies be
deployed to squarely meet the pre-existing misconceptions about the programs themselves, the mystifying role of law in naturalizing and insulating
the status quo must also be radically rethought. Central to both these efforts
is the steady development of persuadable backstories and telling metaphors
to wrest away from supporters as well as opponents their critical investment
in the naturalness of the status quo. Nothing is more important to this mission than challenging the idea of preference.
One project undertaken by the AAPF seeks to advance this reframing by
synthesizing existing knowledge from a variety of disciplines and sources
and delivering these ideas in a way that represents the issues in a more compelling framework. As an example of this reframing project, consider one of
the most common metaphors used to capture the competing interests at
stake in affirmative action, the image of the equal opportunity race. In an
ideal race all runners start at the same point and the rightful rewards go to
the best runners. But affirmative action is said to place some runners a half
length or more ahead of non-preferred runners. In this context, both opponents and defenders of affirmative action tend to agree that this placement
represents a preference for those who are placed ahead in the staggered
start. They disagree, however, about whether such preferences are justified.
For opponents, the head start is unfair, inefficient, divisive and counterproductive. In their view, the beneficiaries of affirmative action are tainted
because they are given an unfair advantage. No matter how well they’ve run
the race, their accomplishments cannot be credited or trusted. In this scenario, the non-preferred runners have every reason to be resentful because
they have been forced to run in a rigged race and have likely lost their rightful place in the winner’s box.
The defenders of affirmative action worry about the resentment and
other costs associated with sustaining such exceptions to the fair race, but
they argue that the benefits of a diverse set of winners offsets these costs.
While the two sides differ in their normative assessment of whether the head
start is defensible or not, what they share is actually more telling: both tend
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to see the problem of affirmative action in terms of damaged runners unable
to compete on their own. As long as affirmative action is framed in terms of
damaged runners, there is little wonder that opposition to it will continue to
be intense, and that support for it, even among some of its beneficiaries, will
often be lukewarm.
But, there is an alternative back story that can be told, one that actually
throws light on the conditions that affirmative action is designed to address.
This alternative frame suggests that the problem affirmative action seeks to
address is not damaged runners, but damaged lanes that make the race more
difficult for some competitors to run than others. Rethinking affirmative
action so as to account for the unequal conditions of the lanes on the track—
the debris that runners must avoid, the craters over which they must climb,
the crevices that they must jump and the detours that they must maneuver—
suggests that affirmative action is not about providing preferences at all.
Rather it is about removing and neutralizing the obstacles and conditions
that compromise the fair running of the race. Structural inequality, exclusionary institutional practices, trans-generational disadvantages and even
unconscious biases are just a few of the conditions that crowd the lanes of
would-be recipients of affirmative programs. These conditions are neither
mysterious nor unverifiable. In fact, they can be empirically demonstrated
with relative ease, as research from a variety of fields reveals. To attend to
the elimination of such circumstances is hardly to promote reverse discrimination. It reflects only a matter of simple justice.
Thus, for affirmative action to be productively reframed, the pervasive
and troubling disconnect between what is knowable about contemporary
inequality has to be brought into mainstream discourse on affirmative action.
Conclusion
Affirmative action discourse can be strengthened by reconnecting it to
its equality-based moorings, by building an effective counter-narrative to the
prevailing backstories that so utterly distort the causes and consequences of
racial inequality today. Most fundamentally, affirmative action needs to be
rescued from the distortions produced by colorblindness, which must be
exposed and deposed. As demonstrated above, colorblindness manages to do
its work without the opposition it might otherwise warrant by masquerading
as the heir apparent to the very movement that it seeks to contain and destabilize.
This strategy is all the more remarkable given the breathtakingly bold
act of cooptation that this re-deployment of colorblindness represents. Conceived in the pitched battle against white supremacy, colorblind rhetoric has
been ripped from the grasp of the movements’ martyrs and reared to repudiate its liberationist legacy. Far from serving as a beacon of hope, a new
baseline representing what American could have been in the absence of
deeply entrenched patterns of white supremacy, colorblindness now delivers
its reputation and historical capital to a specious claim that the journey to
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the promised land is nearly complete. In so doing, it helps turn the page
away from the wrenching human drama of a desperate group struggle
against a soul-destroying, virtually unshakable system of white supremacy
to a fairy tale confection of poppy fields and wishful thinking. In this sense,
it now delivers us to the new day by its hypnotic command to close our eyes
and click our heels, whispering the glorious mantra “there’s no place like
America.”
For many, this romp through the poppy-fields of denial provides a relief
from the gnawing sense that something has been left behind, a faint recollection that there really is something terribly wrong with our social
structure. In this instant of distraction, a face-off between colorblindness
and affirmative action occurred that few seem to notice. In that flicker of
time, affirmative action was vacuumed out of its modest role as a facilitator
of change, a corrector, a remover of obstacles, and it is now installed as the
quintessential embodiment of the posse of problems that it was designed to
vanquish—discrimination, racial supremacy, segregation, and racial stereotyping. While affirmative action struggles to escape these false associations,
colorblindness is now poised to assume the throne of racial justice in
American society. Should it succeed, the whole family of ideas bound up
with affirmative action—the imperative of addressing institutional discrimination, the value of diversity, the relevance of disparate impact, the simple
justice of Brown v. Board of Education, will be banished from legitimate
discourse.
At the end of the day, this is really what is at stake in these contests over
affirmative action. If intellectual, legal and political resources are not deployed to arrest this development, the ever broadening category of
“preference” will eventually grow to include every race sensitive policy including the conscious objective of achieving a fully diverse and integrated
society.

